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How Next-Generation Teams and Teaming May Affect the Ethics of Working in Teams

Scott S. Wiltermuth and Alyssa J. Han

12.1 Introduction

The way people work in teams is changing. The changes are affecting what work teams look like and how those teams function. In years past people worked for the same organizations for many years, perhaps even their whole careers (see Sullivan, 1999 for review). Because their colleagues also stayed in the same organizations for many years, they were likely to work on teams that had relatively stable memberships. This has changed. People now switch employers more frequently and they change roles within organizations more often (Miles & Snow, 1996; Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1995). They are also more likely to work as independent contractors rather than as employees of the company and seek to develop a "boundaryless career" defined as "a sequence of job opportunities that go beyond the boundaries of a single employment setting" (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1996, p. 116).

These trends have accelerated over the last couple of decades (Edmondson, 2012). More recently, organizations have even ramped up their use of "flash teams," which may not ever meet physically and may exist only for a short and, often, pre-defined amount of time (Retelny et al., 2014). These teams exist to achieve specific objectives and their members go their separate ways right after the specific task is accomplished. In many cases there is no expectation of a future work relationship and the only way people have communicated with their teammates is electronically. As such, the concept of working in a team may mean something very different in the coming years than it did twenty years ago, or even than it does today.

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to how these changing relationships with teammates can influence people's ability to coordinate and collaborate effectively with each other (e.g., Edmonson, 2012; Tannenbaum, Mathieu, Salas, & Cohen, 2012). Scholars have also studied how these changes affect people's satisfaction with their work (e.g., Altman & Post, 1996). Much less attention has been paid to how the changing nature of teams may affect the ethics involved with working on those teams (but see Tannenbaum & Valentine, in press). We focus in this chapter on that question.

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We examine the ethical implications of changing team dynamics for a couple of reasons. First, we believe it is important for organizations and managers to understand how their employees or contractors are likely to treat each other if they are concerned about the well-being of those employees or contractors. Organizations may use this information to set up systems and procedures to motivate their employees and contractors to play well with others. In essence they may be able to anticipate what external forces might be needed to replace internal pressures to treat each other decently, which may have been stronger when employees had more regular and closer contact with each other. Second, we believe that organizations may be able to take steps to improve the performance of their teams if they better understand how the ethical concerns guiding behavior are changing. Values like loyalty and fairness help teams work effectively. These values have led people to be more likely to sacrifice for the common good of the team. If these values are diminished when teams are more transient and teammates have less physical contact with one another, organizations may need to design incentives or work processes to compensate for the diminished influence that ethical values may exert on team behavior.

We begin our analysis of how next-generation teams and teaming may affect the ethics of working in teams by first describing how the nature of teams is changing. We then examine which values are most likely affected by the changes in team structure and team processes. Specifically, we consider the values of fairness and loyalty, which are two of the core foundations of morality (Graham et al., 2013; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007). For each foundation we describe the likely change in influence the value may have on behavior and attitudes. Finally, we describe strategies for managers wishing to adapt to and cope with the changing role of each ethical concern.

12.1.1 How Teams Are Changing

Next-generation teams are unlikely to look like the teams of twenty years ago. Over the last thirty years society has seen a shift from people staying with employers for long tenures to people changing employers relatively frequently. Society has also seen a sharp increase in the percentage of people working as independent contractors, and a decline in the percentage of people who are employees per se of the companies for whom they are providing labor (Katz & Krueger, 2016). Teams have consequently come to have less stable memberships than they have had in the past.

The change from teams as they currently exist to what they look like in the not-so-distant future may be just as dramatic as the change has been over the last few decades. In Silicon Valley we are already starting to see the emergence of flash teams, which are temporary teams that pop up virtually to work on particular

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issues (Valentine, Retelny, To, Rahmati, Doshi, & Bernstein, 2017). Such teams come together quickly and they dissipate just as quickly as soon as the project for which they had assembled is finished. For some types of tasks, the quick assembly and the just-as-quick disassembly of the team is commonplace. Websites such as Mturk.com, Upwork, Elance, and others enable managers to outsource work to people whom they are not likely to meet. While most of the work completed on these websites is either complex work handled by individuals or simple work completed by a larger number of people, some websites have arisen in hopes of enabling companies to complete more complex tasks requiring teamwork without having either to physically assemble and hire teams or spend time working on contracts for the independent contractors. For example, the start-up company Foundry used its platform to show that it is possible to enable a group of specialized employees to complete interdependent work online to create short films in short time periods.

We expect the capacity of people to collaborate virtually and in teams constituted by unstable memberships to increase sharply over the next twenty years. Technological tools enabling such work will no doubt improve. Moreover, the people who have the talent to complete complex, interdependent work without spending significant time with their teammates will likely increasingly accept work opportunities over the Internet. There is consequently hope that these kinds of virtual teams with dynamic memberships will be tremendous tools. However, people working on these types of teams will no doubt face some predictable obstacles. For example, teams will likely struggle with coordination neglect (Crowston, 1997; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Wageman, 1995) and the communication challenges brought about by forms of communication through relatively impoverished media, such as email (Daft & Lengel, 1984, 1986; Straus & McGrath, 1994). As significant research has shown, the potential for miscommunication can increase when people do not have an opportunity to spend time with each other and interact face-to-face. We also anticipate that people working on these teams will be subject to different ethical compulsions and hold different attitudes about what it means to be an ethical team member. We explore this issue in Section 12.2.

12.1.2 Dilemma of How to Use Next-Generation Teams with Attenuated Concerns About Ethics

We hypothesize that people on these short-lived teams, that may or may not interact primarily through electronic forms of communication, may face ethics-related challenges that are not experienced to the same extent by more traditional teams. So too may those who try to lead these teams. Managers and team members who want to take advantage of the power of these new forms of teams therefore face a dilemma. How does one motivate team members to cooperate

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fully with one another, subjugate their own individual interests, and contribute fully toward fulfilling the group's interest when so many of the forces that have driven these tendencies in traditional teams may be attenuated? How does one either instill a sense of loyalty among people who may never meet each other face-to-face or compensate for the attenuated loyalty that may result from the lack of face-to-face interaction? How does one get team members to regard resource and workload allocations as fair when there may not be a long term to smooth out inequities that may occur in the short term?

In the subsequent sections we examine which ethical values are likely to receive different degrees of emphasis in intragroup relationships as a result of teams becoming more temporary and less based on relationships that involve face-to-face interactions. We propose that people will come to view their teammates and/or their relationships to those teammates very differently when people enter and depart teams frequently and they have little real-world interaction with their teammates. We examine how the change in team dynamics are likely to affect the team's performance. Finally, we suggest strategies to cope with the potentially attenuated role that some ethical concerns might play in shaping team behavior.

12.2 Which Ethical Values Will Play Attenuated Roles in Shaping Team Behavior?

Moral foundations theory holds that people view morality as consisting of five distinct moral values (Haidt & Graham, 2007). These include harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. The latter three foundations are generally described as binding foundations that bring and hold social groups together, whereas the first two foundations describe concerns for the individual. It is possible that teams becoming more temporary and less likely to be rooted in real-world relationships could affect the degree to which team leaders and team members consider each of these foundations in determining how they should behave toward and with their teammates. However, we believe that concern with two particular foundations will be affected more than the other foundations will be affected. Specifically, we posit that the move to virtual, temporary teams will alter most how people on teams think about loyalty toward their teammates and what they perceive as fair. We therefore concentrate our analysis on these two moral foundations.

12.3 Loyalty

Loyalty can drive much of team behavior. Although loyalty has been conceptualized in various ways, at its core it can be understood as "the principle of partiality

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towards an object (e.g., a group) that gives rise to expectations of behavior on behalf of that object such as sacrifice, trustworthiness, and pro-sociality" (Hildreth, Gino, & Bazerman, 2016, p. 17). When the object of one's loyalty is a group, loyalty manifests in forms of behavior that further the interests of the group, even if those behaviors involve personal sacrifice (Hildreth et al., 2016; Schrag, 2001; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). These behaviors can range from the highly ethical, such as engaging in prosocial acts on behalf of one's team members, to the highly unethical, such as cheating on behalf of one's team. The common denominator is that these behaviors are motivated by a desire to further the interests of the group.

Previous work on group loyalty has primarily examined teams with traditional stable structures (Tannenbaum, Mathieu, Salas, & Cohen, 2012). The characteristics of traditional teams that once gave rise to loyalty or the expectation of loyalty from others may exist to lesser degrees in temporary teams and virtual teams. We therefore revisit the role that loyalty is expected to play within such teams in order to better understand the ethics-related challenges that managers might now face.

12.3.1 Catalyzing Pro-Group Behavior

People in next-generation teams will likely have less exposure to their fellow team members than they did in traditional teams (Hackman, 1987, 2012; Tannenbaum et al., 2012; Wageman, Gardner, & Mortensen, 2012). Whether this is due to the temporary nature of the team or the lack of face-to-face interaction in virtual teams, the outcome is that people lack shared time and experiences with their team members. Members of temporary and virtual teams are consequently less likely to build social bonds with one another than members of traditional stable teams. Given that "loyalties develop over time because of a continuity of overlapping, shared experiences of the same place or persons or events," these short-lived teams and virtual teams lack the very characteristics necessary for loyalties to develop among team members (Schrag, 2001, p. 44). The knowledge that future collaboration with one's current teammates is limited also likely hinders the development of loyalty. Without the expectation of future reciprocity and accountability, team members are less likely to develop a sense of trust, which is an important component of loyalty (Hildreth et al., 2016; Schrag, 2001).

One likely consequence of this attenuated loyalty is that team members may become less willing to exert extra effort on behalf of their team. Extra-role behaviors are those employee behaviors that go above and beyond the job expectations, such as helping out a team member by taking on extra work or voicing methods for improvement (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Organ, 1988, 1997; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). Researchers have long recognized the importance of employee extra-role

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behaviors in contributing to the viability and success of groups and organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Organ, 1988).

Heightened group identification increases employees' willingness to perform extra-role behaviors (Blader & Tyler, 2009; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). According to social identity theory and self-categorization theory, group identification results from individuals perceiving themselves as belonging to some human aggregate (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). As individuals identify with a particular group, they not only come to define themselves in terms of their group membership, but they also begin to personally experience the successes and failures of the group as their own (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Unsurprisingly then, individuals become inherently concerned with the welfare of the team when they strongly identify with it.

In traditional teams, the stability of the team structure facilitates the development of identification with and loyalty to one's team. Stability therefore increases the likelihood that team members will in turn engage in these extra-role behaviors. However, the same cannot be said for temporary and virtual teams. To the extent that members of these new types of teams are less likely to develop loyalty to their team, there is little to motivate such members to engage in extra-role behaviors on behalf of the team. Managers may even find that members are less motivated to fulfill their prescribed duties and more likely to free-ride when possible. We discuss this problem of free-riding in greater detail in a later section.

One positive outcome of diminished loyalty, however, is that team members may become less likely to cheat on behalf of their teams. Research has shown that people are more likely to cheat when the beneficiaries of their wrongdoing include other individuals besides themselves (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Wiltermuth, 2011). In fact, people become more likely to cheat as the number of beneficiaries of their wrongdoing increases (Gino et al., 2013). Researchers have also found that employees are often willing to engage in unethical behaviors on behalf of their organizations (Chen, Chen, & Sheldon, 2016; Thau, Derfler-Rozin, Pitesa, Mitchell, & Pillutla, 2015; Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010). Whereas cheating for one's own gain tarnishes one's own self-image, people find it easier to justify unethical behavior when such behavior is done for the benefit of others (Wiltermuth, 2011). This is even more likely to be the case when people feel a greater connection to or identification with the potential beneficiaries of their unethical acts (Chen et al., 2016; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Umphress et al., 2010). With the change from traditional team structures to temporary and virtual team structures, as team members have less contact with one another and less opportunities to develop social bonds with one another, they may also be less motivated to commit unethical acts on behalf of their team. Therefore, the diminishing loyalty in temporary and virtual teams may reduce people's willingness to engage in pro-group behaviors that are unethical in nature.

12.3.2 Deterring Team Abandonment

Traditionally, scholars characterized teams as a bounded set of individuals (Hackman, 1987, 2012; Tannenbaum et al., 2012; Wageman et al., 2012). However, temporary teams, flash teams, and virtual teams are more likely to have fluid memberships, with people coming and going more frequently than before (Hackman, 2012; Tannenbaum et al., 2012; Wageman et al., 2012). When the composition of teams changes so frequently, it may even become difficult for individuals to identify who is actually a member of one's team (Wageman, Nunes, Burruss, & Hackman, 2008). The consequence of having such fluidity in membership is that team members may become even less likely to identify with and develop loyalty to their team given that the team is constantly changing.

Even when membership is not fluid, temporary teams and virtual teams may nevertheless have ambiguous boundaries. Such ambiguity is especially likely in – but certainly not limited to – cases in which team members are geographically dispersed, as with virtual teams (Mortensen & Hinds, 2002). Members might not only experience difficulty identifying other members of the team but also disagree among one another as to who are and who are not members of the team (Mortensen, 2014). In certain situations, individuals might even fail to recognize that they themselves are a part of a team. In ad-hoc teams, while there may be a number of people who are working towards the same goal, each individual might perform his/her respective job individually. These individuals may consequently fail to recognize that they themselves are working as part of a team to accomplish a common goal. For example, researcher Amy Edmondson (2012) narrates a scenario in a hospital in which multiple different health care specialists each individually attend to the same patient as they prep the patient for a CT scan. In a series of discrete steps, each specialist completes a separate task. Altogether the work is interdependent since each step depends upon the successful execution of the former (by a different specialist) and therefore requires a certain level of coordination to provide proper patient care. However, due to the nature of their work, these health professionals may have very little direct interaction with one another. They may therefore not even see themselves as part of a team (Edmondson, 2012).

Scholars have suggested that in order to identify with a particular group, not only do individuals need to feel that they belong within the group, but they also require a clear sense of boundaries that differentiate their own group from other groups (Brewer, 1991, 1999). Without clear delineation of group boundaries, compounded by the fluidity of membership, individuals may be more likely to experience uncertainty regarding membership – whether one's own or that of other potential team members. In turn, this uncertainty is expected to hinder the development of loyalty and attachment to one's team.

The danger of this is that temporary and virtual teams may be more likely to suffer from what researchers have called the exit problem (Van Vugt & Hart,

2004). When team members do not experience loyalty to their team, they become more likely to leave the group at will, which can potentially lead to a loss of valuable human capital. Researchers have demonstrated that individuals who strongly identify with a group are more willing to stay with that group, even when doing so would not be personally beneficial to themselves (Van Vugt & Hart, 2004; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). On the other hand, those who do not strongly identify with a group are likely to abandon the group once it benefits them to do so, even at the expense of the remaining members. The fuzzy boundaries and fluid membership of next-generation teams may lead individuals to feel greater license to leave the team at will.[1]

12.3.3 Multiple Team Membership and the Devaluation of Community

With temporary teams and virtual teams, individuals may also be more likely to feel a lack of commitment to one specific team. As such, individuals may be more likely to join multiple teams at once. Research has shown that multiple team membership – a situation in which individuals are members of two or more teams concurrently – is more common than expected (O'Leary, Mortensen, & Woolley, 2011; Tannenbaum et al., 2012). Unfortunately, multiple team membership is likely to pose challenges to the development of familiarity and trust within a given team (Mortensen, Woolley, & O'Leary, 2007). In part, this may be due to the fact that individuals who are a part of multiple teams now have these various teams competing for group identification and loyalty (O'Leary et al., 2011). Individuals who are a part of multiple teams may also have less time and energy to devote to a particular team. Given the time constraints arising from multiple team commitments, team members are likely to be more task-focused rather than relationship-focused when working as part of any given team (Pluut, Flestea, & Curseu, 2014). As a result, managers of such teams may be more likely to encounter greater challenges to fostering social bonds and loyalty among team members.

Individuals are likely to experience a decreased sense of commitment to social groups regardless of whether they belong to too many teams or they fail to recognize that they are part of a team. People may come to devalue community and loyalty as they begin to adopt more of an individualistic mindset in their jobs. In turn, a widespread increase in the adoption of individualistic mindsets could contribute to an erosion of the social capital – including social networks and norms of reciprocity – that is essential for cooperation (Putnam, 2000). As people adopt an individualistic concept of work, managers may encounter an exacerbation of existing challenges like coordination neglect (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). Team members may become slower to develop loyalties and quicker to abandon them, and the noncommittal nature of these next-generation teams may further perpetuate the challenge to team loyalty.

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12.3.4 Team Heterogeneity

Temporary and virtual teams are much more likely to be comprised of members of diverse backgrounds than traditional teams (Edmondson, 2012; Tannenbaum et al., 2012; Townsend, DeMarie, & Hendrickson, 1998). Members are likely to vary widely in terms of geographic location, demographic characteristics, cultural backgrounds, and their areas of expertise (Edmondson, 2012). These factors matter because group heterogeneity can have a negative impact on group cohesion and cooperation (Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998). People often classify themselves and others into groups on the basis of perceived similarity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). People will perceive similar individuals as ingroup members and dissimilar individuals as outgroup members (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). As such, when people are members of heterogeneous teams comprised of a number of dissimilar others, they may be less likely to identify with their team as a whole. Ingroups and outgroups may form even within a single team, with members displaying favoritism and loyalty towards certain members and not others.

Additionally, team heterogeneity may pose a challenge to rallying team members around common norms and values. Due to the diverse backgrounds, team members may be accustomed to different cultural and workplace norms, as well as different moral beliefs (Edmondson, 2012). For instance, members might not only differ in terms of their beliefs on right and wrong, but they may also weigh different moral values to varying extents (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Such differences are likely to cause tensions and conflict among team members. Without team loyalty serving as a unifying force, managers may experience greater difficulty establishing common ground among members on such issues.

When team members have little exposure to one another in temporary heterogeneous teams, it may actually be possible that the lack of identification with the team will serve as a barrier to the contagion of unethical behavior within the team. Research has shown that when people witness an individual behaving unethically, they become more likely to behave unethically themselves only when they perceive that individual as an ingroup member. When people perceive the individual as an outgroup member, they become less likely to behave unethically themselves, due to a desire to differentiate themselves from the "bad apple" (Brewer, 1993; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). To the extent that individuals in heterogeneous teams are less likely to perceive other team members as ingroup members, this may help to diminish the spreading of unethical behavior within the team. Additionally, whereas a sense of loyalty to one's team member might prevent one from doing so, in temporary and virtual teams, individuals may be more willing to report the unethical behavior of others (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). Of course, whether a team member would

actually go out of his/her way to do so is uncertain, given that the reporting of unethical behavior is usually a form of an extra-role behavior, which, as previously discussed, is expected to become less likely with the attenuation of loyalty in these next-generation teams (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Trevino & Victor, 1992).

12.4 Fairness

People managing next-generation temporary teams and teams that interact mostly in virtual contexts also likely face different issues regarding the fairness of work and rewards than people managing traditional teams have historically faced. We will now consider a number of these issues.

12.4.1 Fairness As a Constraint on Free-Riding and Social Loafing

The emergence of temporary teams and teams that exist primarily on a virtual basis likely also has important consequences for how people on the team think about fairness. As discussed in Section 12.3 on loyalty, people will likely have less concern about how their actions impact other team members because their relationships with those team members are not as developed. This may be the case regardless of whether the team exists almost entirely as a virtual team or the team is temporary and people do not have much time to develop social bonds with their teammates. People feel worse about letting others down or free-riding off of others' efforts when they have had personal contact with their team members than they do when they do not know them. Indeed, over 100 studies have shown that people free-ride less often and cooperate more often when they have a chance to socialize with other team members (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; for review see Sally, 1995). Studies have similarly shown that people engage in more free-riding behavior in virtual teams than they do in face-to-face teams (Chidambaram & Tung, 2005). In short, the compelling force of wanting to be fair to one's team members may therefore not be so compelling in an environment in which one does not know the people who would suffer from the free-riding or social loafing.

However, people may not only become more likely to free-ride in temporary teams or virtual teams simply because they have less concern for harming people that they don't know. Instead, they may exert less effort because they may perceive there to be less accountability for actions in that environment. They may therefore expect others to contribute less to the collective effort. This expectation could make them feel like a "sucker" if they end up contributing more to the common effort than others do (Kerr, 1983; Mulvey & Klein, 1998; Orbell & Dawes, 1981; Schnake, 1991). Opposition to this potential inequity and the feeling that one has been taken advantage of by team members may lead

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people who would otherwise give their all to the collective effort to hold back. Thus, it may not be less concern for teammates but a lowered trust in teammates that could lead people to refrain from exerting as much effort toward the collective goal as they might if they had longer and face-to-face relationships with their teammates.

This concern about people not contributing to the common effort may be particularly acute in tasks in which either individual effort or the result of individual effort is hard to measure. In such settings, people feel less accountable for their actions. This may tempt people to get away with social loafing in such teams because the probability of negative consequences arising from free-riding would be diminished. In such settings people may also perceive that their teammates will feel that they will be less accountable for their actions. As such, a lack of accountability could lead people both to feel uninhibited about free-riding because of diminished concern for teammates and to make people perceive that those teammates will free-ride themselves.

Free-riding may also be a particularly important concern for next-generation teams in which roles are ambiguous, to the extent that the role ambiguity makes contributions less identifiable. When the contributions of individual group members become less identifiable free-riding becomes more likely (Harkins, 1987; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996). When roles are ambiguous people may not only be able to shield themselves from accountability but also genuinely construe tasks as being outside of their jobs.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the ambiguous roles may lead people to take on an increased sense of responsibility for team success if the ambiguity of roles makes them feel either more in control of the work that they do or more involved in numerous significant aspects of the team's process. Research on the job characteristics model holds that autonomy and task variety can each heighten workers' intrinsic motivation to do a job well (Hackman & Oldman, 1976). The flexibility required of team members when there is not a formal structure to the teams and the roles are somewhat ambiguous may also help people feel like an indispensable member of the team. These feelings can also decrease free-riding and social loafing (Price, Harrison, & Gavin, 2006).

12.4.2 Divisions of Labor and Resources

People's fundamental attitudes about what divisions of labor and resources are fair could also start to change if they start working on temporary teams and do not have sufficient time to develop strong social bonds with one another. People make egocentric attributions of how much they contribute to common efforts because they have privileged access to their own thoughts and behaviors (Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991). A lack of observability exacerbates egocentric perceptions of fairness (Thompson &

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Loewenstein, 1992) because it means that team members do not have the impetus to correct their egocentric attributions of contributions and effort. This suggests that increased contact with others may make people more likely to accept labor splits if their increased contact with teammates reveals that team members are making contributions to the collective effort. For example, people may be opposed to splitting the marketing of a product between domestic and international markets because the task of marketing to the international market may seem more daunting. If, however, the person who is held responsible for the international marketing has an opportunity to see the nuances required in domestic marketing and the effort involved with it, her resistance to this division of labor may wane. We consequently propose that in ad-hoc teams and in teams that meet only virtually people might have less of an opportunity to observe what their teammates have to do; and they may therefore reject divisions of labor that they might otherwise have found acceptable if they had insight into the effort involved in fulfilling their teammates' responsibilities.

Of course, the transparent views that traditional teams offer into how much teammates are working can cut the other way. If one's teammates are slacking, that slacking may be more evident if one has the opportunity to work for longer stints with the teammate or in physical proximity to them. It is therefore possible that people may be more accepting of labor allocations that place more of a burden on themselves in temporary teams and teams that work virtually than they would be in more traditional teams.

We believe, however, that it is much more likely that people will be more willing to shoulder more of the load in traditional teams than they would be in temporary teams or in teams that only meet virtually. As already noted, the heightened transparency about how much teammates are working may either increase or decrease an individual's likelihood to shoulder a significant portion of the workload to be completed. However, the emotional connection that comes from frequent and meaningful contact would likely produce more directionally-consistent effects. In most cases social contact heightens empathy (for review see Davis, 2018) and people's willingness to sacrifice for the common good (for review see Sally, 1995). We would therefore expect that if people in next-generation teams have less contact with their teammates, they may be less willing to shoulder workloads that could be perceived as unfair.

These considerations raise the question of whether allocation norms should be different on next-generation teams than they should be on more traditional teams. Our intuition is that the amount of effort people contribute toward the team's goals may be more difficult to observe with next-generation teams than it would be in more traditional teams. If the productivity stemming from individuals' efforts are no more observable in these teams (and we have no reason to believe they would be), members of next-generation teams may have more objections to (and more support for) equity-based distribution than would members of teams in which effort would be more directly observable. We caution that our speculation

may not hold if new technology enables people to measure individuals' efforts and contributions to team success. If so, people on next-generation teams may be more comfortable with equity norms than people on traditional teams have been.

12.4.3 Managing Fairness Across Projects

People managing traditional teams that work on several projects and have relatively stable memberships have a tool to ensure fairness that those managing temporary teams designed to work on a single project do not have. Specifically, they have the ability to manage fairness across projects.

On some projects, equal distribution of work may be either impractical or inefficient. This may occur for at least two reasons. First, it may make sense for one employee to take on a disproportionately large part of the task because the elements of that portion of the task are sufficiently connected that those elements are best performed by one person. Second, it may be that the learning acquired from completing one element of the task makes the marginal cost of completing the other elements of that portion of the task so low that it is logical for one person to complete all elements of that portion of the task.

If it is not practical to offer differential rewards that depend upon the amount of work an individual on a team takes on, people looking to create temporary teams may find themselves facing a challenge. According to equity theory (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), the teammate who shoulders most of the load on that project may feel a sense of inequity in that ratio of effort to rewards will not seem commensurate to the ratio experienced by other team members. In traditional teams that handle numerous projects this issue is easier to fix. Managers can assign different allocations of work on the next project, such that in the long run the allocation of work responsibilities and benefits will even out. When there is no such option to even out the work across projects managers will likely be hamstrung in their ability to appear fair and just in their allocation of responsibilities.

12.4.4 Potential for Adverse Selection of People Joining Temporary and Virtual Teams

Managers assembling temporary teams or teams that will exist largely on a virtual basis alone might also need to think about selection in ways that differ from how they did so for more traditional teams. A number of characteristics related to the complementarity of team members may be more important when assembling teams that will have relatively stable memberships and interact with each other in face-to-face settings than when assembling teams that will be short-lived and/or exists primarily through virtual interactions. Personality mismatches, for example,

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may be more irksome when people have to interact regularly with their teammates.

However, managers assembling temporary teams, flash teams, or teams that meet only virtually may face a selection hazard faced less often by managers assembling more traditional teams. Potential team members may believe that an assignment to a virtual team or one that is only slated to exist for a relatively-short period of time will mean that they will be held less accountable for their work. They may also believe that the cost to contributing comparably little to a team's effort would be lower than it would be in a traditional team because employers or team members might be less able to punish this kind of social loafing or free-riding. People who are not particularly interested in contributing effort to the team's effort may become disproportionately more likely to apply to work on these sorts of teams. As such, people staffing these temporary teams may face an adverse selection issue in that they may be creating a moral hazard such that people who are lazy (but calculating) may be more likely than others to find their way onto such teams.

12.4.5 The Fairness of Dismissing Team Members

Although adverse selection issues may arise when people are staffing temporary teams, people hiring for such teams likely have other factors compensating for the risk of adverse selection. Consider what happens if a team adds a member who has some issues that detract from the team's performance. Regardless of whether the new team member lacks skill, effort, or just is a poor fit for the team, the people running the team may more easily rid themselves of the team member in the short term than would people running more traditional teams.

The status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetch, & Thaler, 1991) lies at the root of why this would be. If an employee has just a marginally negative impact on the team it may be socially costly for the people running a traditional team to let the employee go. Employee morale could suffer and people may develop animosity toward team management. The presumption in this case is that employees will work indefinitely and any decision to change that requires enough evidence to overcome people's natural bias to hold to the status quo, which in this case is ongoing employment. If, on the other hand, the team exists explicitly to handle a short-term project, people would be more likely to see the default outcome as employees working for a preset amount of time and leaving thereafter. Both the worker not remaining on the team and the teammates of that person might find this outcome less bracing because having a contract not renewed may be seen as the default option that people should have been expecting. In short, team members may see teams letting people go as "fairer" when the team members believe that their tenure on teams will be time-bound.

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12.5 Strategies to Adapt to Changing Ethics of Teams

In the previous sections we outlined a few key ways that the changing nature of teamwork is likely influencing the ethical concerns associated with working in teams. We have detailed how reductions in the amount of exposure people have with their teammates may change team members' views toward the importance of loyalty and how these reductions may also promote more egocentric views of fairness. The outlook we provide is not altogether bright – as we suggest that feelings of loyalty may be lower on next-generation teams than on traditional teams and that people may take others' perspectives less when assessing the fairness of work and resource distributions. Such changes, of course, do not bode well for the effectiveness of teams.

These predictions raise the question of what teams can do to compensate for the changes in how people view loyalty and fairness in teams. We would argue that the research literature on virtual, geographically-disparate teams provides many useful suggestions even for teams that do connect face-to-face but do not have long histories or long expected existences. Of course, next-generation teams are likely to differ from existing virtual teams. For example, the expected duration of teams' existences will differ, as will the degree of turnover on the team. As such, they face some different challenges. We will now provide some suggested ways to ameliorate the ethical challenges that next-generation teams are likely to present.

12.5.1 In-Person Initial Meetings

Studies have documented that initial in-person meetings can go a long way toward establishing trust within virtual teams (Hill, Bartol, Tesluk, & Langa, 2009; Rocco, 1998). Research has shown that the initial medium of communication among team members is important for the development of trust given that different communication mediums convey contextual information – such as behavioral cues – to varying degrees, with face-to-face communication offering the richest information (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Hill et al., 2009; Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006). Introductory face-to-face meetings can function as a transition phase wherein team members can prepare for their upcoming work together (Hill et al., 2009). These meetings can help establish social norms of cooperation, and they may even go so far as to facilitate the development of a group identity (Rocco, 1998). In-person meetings may also deter behaviors like social loafing by eliminating team members' ability to hide behind anonymity. Those who create virtual teams may therefore find that scheduling introductory face-to-face meetings will increase trust, loyalty, and cooperation among team members.

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12.5.2 Shifting the Target of Loyalty

If people have less loyalty to teams because they are having less contact with team members, it may be helpful to try to instill loyalty to a different target. More specifically, it may be helpful to try to instill loyalty to a target that is more constant than the unfamiliar and changing members of one's team. Leaders might try to build team loyalty by encouraging team members to identify with the team's shared vision or goal, rather than with one's team's members. By emphasizing the shared goal towards which team members are collectively working, leaders can foster team loyalty in the same way that social movements give rise to a collective identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001).

Those leading teams could also exert efforts to build loyalty to the organization if the team members consistently work on teams within that same organization. As previous research has shown, there are a number of ways to heighten organizational identification and increase loyalty (Mael & Ashforth, 1992; Smidts, Pruyn, & Van Riel, 2001). For instance, leaders can emphasize the status and prestige of the organization to increase team members' sense of pride in being a part of such an organization. When team members come to identify with the same organization, they may experience a greater sense of group cohesion even when they do not have much contact with one another.

12.5.3 Appealing to Professionalism and Individualism

Building loyalty to the organization may not be as effective when organizations hire contractors who also work for many other organizations. In such cases, appealing to the professionalism of workers may be more effective. People assembling and organizing teams may productively remind employees that being a professional in their area entails both a strong work ethic and an ability to work well with others. In this way shirking duties or not extending maximum effort would transform from an indication of how much the individual cares about the project to a reflection of that worker's professionalism and perhaps even integrity.

In situations where team members have widely adopted an individualistic mindset of work, leaders may be able to reframe what such mindsets mean for workplace behavior. Leaders can speak to employees' individualistic mindsets by emphasizing the importance of taking ownership of one's own actions and considering the consequences – both positive and negative – of one's actions for one's own reputation. Doing so may not only empower employees but also discourage them from free-loading.

12.5.4 Strength of Weak Ties

Educating employees on the strength of weak ties can further help with issues related to both loyalty and fairness in temporary and virtual teams. Research on

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social networks has shown that interacting with distant individuals like acquaintances enables people to develop bridges to other social circles, which in turn gives them access to new information and resources as well as opportunities (Granovetter, 1973, 1983, 1995). If the members of next-generation teams are informed of these benefits, they may be more likely to value having their teammates view them positively. This desire may compensate for the attenuated feelings of loyalty and accountability that people may have on next-generation teams.

12.5.5 360-Degree Rating Systems

Organizations can also implement formal structural changes to their team designs in order to reduce the prevalence of potential ethical issues. Organizations could benefit from using 360-degree rating systems to help address free-loading concerns. Members of a team may have more insight than team leaders or supervisors into which team members are pulling their weight (or more than their weight) and which ones are shirking their duties. Work and effort that appears indistinguishable from an outside perspective may be more distinguishable from the viewpoint of the workers within the teams. These rating systems are likely to address problems with free-loading by creating an environment of increased accountability in which employees will want to avoid the negative consequences of failing to do their part. These systems may also incentivize employees to engage in more extra-role behaviors by providing them with credit and recognition for their efforts. Organizations might therefore benefit from implementing 360-degree rating systems when they create next-generation teams. Such rating systems may be particularly effective if these next-generation teams do not have clear official supervisors or leaders who could provide ratings of the team members.

Should the ratings generated by 360-degree rating systems be made public? Would it be useful to have a public rating system similar to Yelp for team members? The results of these rating systems may help those assembling next-generation teams. However, there are also reasons to believe that workers may game such rating systems and that such systems therefore may not be as effective as one might expect. Teammates might preemptively agree to give each other high ratings in order to game the system and ensure that their experiences on the team do not negatively affect their careers or reputations. The use of these rating systems may also provoke retributive ratings, such that workers who are evaluated negatively by their peers may rate those peers more negatively than they otherwise would. Whereas customers enjoy relative anonymity and are not at risk of receiving low ratings themselves when they issue low ratings to stores or service providers on websites like Yelp, workers on teams would not enjoy the same advantages. Publicizing the ratings may even lead to a culture of competition and breed animosity among team members to in turn hinder group cohesion. Creators and developers of teams may therefore potentially benefit by restricting who can see team members' ratings.

12.5.6 Social Influence Tactics

Another way to get around the shortcomings of the 360-degree rating system is to utilize social influence tactics. Research on normative social influence has shown that social norms can have a substantial impact on people's behaviors (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). People who believe other team members are exerting pro-team efforts and exercising honest behaviors (including their usage of the 360-rating system) are more likely to exhibit similar behaviors themselves. There are two ways in which descriptive norms might be established within a team. First, organizations can incorporate into team structures formal channels to inform team members of others' commendable behaviors. By informing team members of others' positive behaviors but not negative behaviors, team members will come to believe that ethical pro-group efforts are commonplace and may in turn feel pressure to engage in similar behaviors themselves. Fortunately, research has shown that such forms of normative influence are under detected by those who are being influenced; meaning that normative messages can be a powerful tool for persuasion without rousing suspicion (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008).

Second, organizations can also establish descriptive norms by utilizing informal structures within the team, such as gossip networks. Researchers have suggested that gossip can function as a source of information about social norms and therefore as a source of social influence (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Kurland & Pelled, 2000). To the extent that leaders can shape employee gossip to include discussion of the positive pro-team behaviors of members, this may influence the recipients of such gossip to also behave in similar ways that benefit the team.

Gossip can also function as a source of social influence by more directly incentivizing team members to behave in proper ways. Knowing that they may become a subject of gossip is likely to deter employees from behaving in ways that will incur negative gossip about themselves, as well as encourage them to behave in ways that will produce positive gossip about themselves (Kurland & Pelled, 2000). Gossip, when managed properly, can therefore effectively police employee behavior for the benefit of the team.

12.6 Conclusion

The changing ways that people work on teams will likely affect how ethical values influence the behavior of people in teams. We believe specifically that the temporary nature of next-generation teams and the tendency for these teams to work virtually will attenuate feelings of loyalty toward team members. We also believe that it will lessen the compulsion people might have to try to treat their teammates fairly. We hope this chapter serves as a warning and as a guide to

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organizational leaders who want to take advantage of the power of next-generation teams while still ensuring that team members will be motivated to contribute to the achievement of the team's goals.

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Endnotes

[1] The permeability of group boundaries alone does not necessarily increase the likelihood of individual mobility (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). We therefore propose that the fluidity of membership will contribute to the exit problem indirectly through the decreased ability of individuals to identify with or develop strong attachments to a changing group.

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